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Deceased.
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Honorable Charles G. Co-vvley, Judge
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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
In the Matter of the Estate of

CORA E. F'ENNER,

Case No.

8086

Deceased.

APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF

STATEMENT OF F·ACTS
The many additional facts set forth in respondent's
brief, ostensibly for the con11nendable purpose of adding
a touch of "human interest" to this appeal, are entirely
dehors the record and, of eourse, appellant has no bass
for ascertaining their truth or falsity~Since, however,
they are clearly irrelevant and immaterial to the issues
before this Court, appellant sub1nits that respondent's
State1nent of Facts is entitled to no persuasive weight.
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2
PRELI~IINARY

STATEMENT

Since the respondent has failed to include a statement of points upon which he relies and further, has
failed to su1nmarize his position, it behooves us to
atten1pt a brief restatement of his apparent contentions
in order to frame our reply. Respondent seems to contend that the interest created in ~1rs. F'enner by the
"Special Provision" was a "power of appointment" and
that since our gross estate statute (59-12-3, Utah Code
Annotated, 1953) does not, in terms, levy a tax on such
a power, it was properly excluded from her gross estate
inventory and appraisal. Respondent alludes to federal
authority to sustain this proposition.
ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES
POINT I.
THE INTEREST MRS. FENNER OWNED AT THE TIME
OF HER DEATH IN THE PROCEEDS OF THE THREE
INSURANCE POLICIES WAS NOT A POWER OF APPOINTMENT BUT A FEE, AND, THEREFORE, SHOULD HAVE
BEEN INCLUDED IN THE DECEDENT'S GROSS ESTATE
FOR TAX PURPOSES.

On page 11 of Respondent's brief there is cited
authoritative. definition of a power of appointment. This
definition reads, in part :
"Such a power has been defined as an
authority' enabling one person to dispose of the
interest which is vested in another * * * a power
of appointment is not an absolute right of property nor is it an estate, for it has none of the elements of an estate." (Emphasis added)
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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Did ~frs. Fenner have "'none of the ele1nents of an
estate" and 'vhat are these eleinents ~
\Vho was "another" in who In the title to the proceeds
have vested~
"'One of the tests of 'ownership' of money or property is the right to dispose of, sell, convey, assign or give
a\vay." (Sta.ndard Oil Company of N.J. vs. Powell P.
Co. Plumbing and Contracting, 144 S.C. 354, 142, S. E.
612, at 615)
There can be no dispute that Mrs. Fenner had the
legal right to dispose of the proceeds, to sell her interest,
convey it, assign it or give it away. She la.cked none of
the perquisites of absolute fee ownership. In every real
sense she "owned" the proceeds. As one authority has
indicated, "the holder of an unrestricted right to appropriate principal enjoys the basic delights of ownership."
(I Paul, Fed. Estate and Gift Taxation, Note 7, P. 223
(1942).) Under such a right to invade the corpus as was
given 11:rs. F'enner, "the life tenant enjoys all the attributes of ownership except the formal trappings of title."
(52 Harvard Law Review, 494 at 522)
Quoting again Respondent's definition of a "power
of appointment" (at p. 12 of her brief) :
"Whether a power of appointment is or is
not exercised, the property that was subject to
the appointment is not subject to distribution as
part of the estate of the donee."
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Here again, the interest created in 1\frs. Fenner fails
to meet Respondent's definition for, as provided in the
last sentence of paragraph 2 of the Special Provision
and cited at page 6 of Respondent's brief, "Should none
of the Insured's said nieces" etc. "be surviving at the
death of the Insured's said wife, as aforesaid, the amount
held under said Option 1, together with any interest
accrued thereon, or the commuted value of any unpaid
certain installments under said Option 3, as the case
1nay be, shall be paid in a single sum to sa.id wife's executors or administrators." Thus Mrs. Fenner was named
as residual legatee under the policies and the proceeds
of the policies were not, "not subject to distribution as
part of the estate of the donee."
''D·UE" AND ''HELD ON DEPOSIT."
Appellant feels it cannot overstress the significance
of the language employed in the policies and the Special
Provision. Throughout the policy and its several addenda
the proceeds are referred to as being "due" (Exhibit
one, p. 4, par. 2 and 2 (b); p. 6), "payable" (Exhibit one,
p. 3), "held on deposit" (Exhibit One, p. 4, par. 2 (b)),
and "left on deposit" (Exhibit One, p. 4, par. 2; p. 6, par.
1). Such phrases are inconsistent with any other conclusion than that Mrs. Fenner was absolute owner of the
proceeds.
Paragraph onB of the Special Provision, reads:
"It is hereby specially provided that the settlement of the amount becoming due by reason of
the death of the Insured shall be made with the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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Insured's 'vife, CORA E. FINNER, if living, as
provided in paragraph 2, if not living, such
amount shall be divided into the number of equal
shares that will provide: ... " one share for each
of Insured's said nieces, etc.
Paragraph 2 reads :

The amount becoming due to the In~sured's
sa.id wife under paragraph 1 shall be left on deposit with the Society in accordance vvith Option
1 of the l\lodes of Settlement at Maturity of
Policy during her lifetime, interest payable
monthly, except that said wife shall have the following privileges: * * (a) On an interest due date
of withdrawing the a.mou.nt held on deposit, or (b)
At any tirne of having the amount held on deposit
paid as a life income in accordance with Option
3 of the said l\Jodes of Settlement. (Emphasis
added)

* * (The use of the word "privileges"
here is clearly a misomer. Prior language
[e.g., " ... settlement of the amount due
shall be made ... " etc.] created a duty to
pay in the Society. In Hohfeldian tern1inology, 1\frs. Fenner had more than a
"privilege," she had a "right" and the
Society was under a "dt~ty" to pay over
the amounts "held on deposit" and "due"
her.)
To lawyer and layman alike these phrases, "due"
and "held on deposit" unequivocably mean actual
ownership, not merely "the means of acquiring" title.
( Cf. Resp. Brief, P. 10.) Indeed, these same phrases
often appear as part of the agreement between bank and
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depositor under an ordinary savings account. No one
has yet successfully contended that because a bank 1nay
require advance notice of withdrawal and 1nay deter1nine

to pay out only on specific days, that the person in "\Yhose
name the account is carried is anything but the absolute
owner. Likewise, the adn1inistrative provision in these
policies that the beneficiary could not withdraw the su1ns
"due" and "held on deposit", except on given days and
after notice, in nowise deprived her of any perquisite of
absolute fee ownership. All Mrs. F·enner needed to do
under the Special Provision of the policies in order to
spend the money in any way she desired was to notify
the Society. It seems clear, therefore, that the language
of the policies created precisely the same rights, duties
and obligations between herself and the company as any
other debtor-creditor relationship-such as an ordinary
bank deposit.
Again, even the most cursory reading of the policies
themselves bears out Appellants contention that title was
not "vested in another," but in the decedent, Mrs. Fenner. (R·espondent, quite understandably, has neglected
to suggest who this "another" could conceivably have
been.)
Clearly, the interest which decendent took "looks
like, sounds like and walks like" a fee.
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POINT II.
SHOULD THIS COURT CHARACTERIZE THE INTER-.
EST TAKEN BY MRS. FENNER IN THE INSURANCE
POLICIES AS A GENERAL POWER OF APPOINTMENT,
SUCH AN INTEREST IS, NEVERTHELESS, WITHIN THE
INCLUSION OF TITLE 59-12-3, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED,
1953.
(A) The Common Law Theory of Powers of Appointment
is Anachronistic and Entirely Unjustified by Present Concepts
of Property Ownership and Responsibility.

Our position is well summarized by Professor Eisenstein in Volume 52 of the Yale Law Journal at page 296.
He writes:
" 'F·or what good reasons should contemporary American taxpayers be allowed to escape a
generation or two of estate and inheritance taxes
by the use of a verbal form [A power of appointment] invented several centuries ago to enable
an English gentleman to make a will of land.'
This query is particularly relevant at a time when
the Supreme Court is openly contemptuous of the
'shadowy and intricate distinctions of common law
property concepts and ancient fictions,' (U. S.
v. Jacobs, 306 U.S. 363, 369) and 'elusive and
subtle casuistries which feed upon the unwitty
diversities of the law of property.' (Helvering
v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 118.)"
The common law concept of a power of appointment
was that the donor of the power created something akin
to an agency in the donee, the latter merely acting as an
instrument of the donor in fillin_g in the blanks -
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title, in theory, passing directly fro1n the donor to his
appointed objects. Thus, no interest in the property was
deemed to have vested in the donee, even though the
donee might be given a general power to invade the
corpus, consume in whole or part, or appoint to any .
object of his, the donee's, choice.
One writer suggests that the more recent trend to'vard the taxing of powers of appointment was prompted
by recognition "that the power to appoint might be so
broad as to be tantamount to economic ownership of the
appointed property." (Estate Taxation of Powers of
Appointment, 77 North Carolina Law Revie-vv, 1948)
Many old common law technicalities (e.g., the requirement of a seal to validate a deed), have long since
been abandoned as unworkable, and where public policy
once favored retention of larger estates in one family
line, it now favors freer alienation and the imposition of
a just tax burden on each citizen enjoying the privileges
of land ownership. This same policy reasoning applies
to personalty. To allow the wealthy owner, by employing careful draftsmen, to call his absolute gift something
else and thus escape his just tax incidence is simply to
perpetuate an unjust and unfair legalism born of early
English aristocratic dictate.
To label an absolute fee something else does not, for
tax purposes, make it so.
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(B) Many Courts Realirstically Treat a General Power of
Appointment as the Substantial equivalent of Ownership, and as
such, Have ·Characterized it as a Fee for Tax Purposes.

The state may lawfully include within its estate tax,
property not technically owned by the decedent at death
if the decedent stood in a relationship to the property
which might fairly be regarded as the equivalent of
ownership. (Btdlen v. Wi.sconsi.n, 240 U.S. 625; Leser v.
Burnet, 46 Fed. 2d, 156.)
The inclusion of property in respect of which the
decedent owned a general power of appoint1nent is
valid because a general power gives the grantee of the
power the substantial equivalent of ownership, since he
is free to exercise it in favor of his creditors and thus
use the property for his own benefit. See:

Ballard v. Helburn, 9 F. Supp. 812; aff'd. 85
F. 2d 613 ; T. C. 4729, March 18, 1937 ; Reg. 80,
Art. 25; Chandler v. Kelsey, 205 U.S. 466, 51 L.
Ed. 882, 27 Sup. Ct. 550; Chase N a~t. Bank v.
United States, 278 U.S. 327; Curry v. McCa,nless,
123 A.L.R. 162, 307 U.S. 357, 83 L. Ed. 1339, 59
Sup. Ct. 900; Fidelity-Philadelphia Trust Co. v.
McCanghn, 3-1 F'. 2d 600, 604, cert. den., 280 U.S.
602; Graves v. Schmidla]; }J, 1-±1 A.L.R. 948, 315
U.S. 657, 86 L. Ed. 1097, 62 Sup. Ct. 870; Helvering v. Barker, H-± F. 2d 838; Levy's Estate v. Cantmissioner, 65 F. 2d 412; Morgan v. Commissioner,
309 U.S. 78; M cK eZ,z;y v. Comnz., 82 F. 2d 393;
Orr v. Gilman, 183 U.S. 278, -1G L. Ed. 196, 22 Sup ..
Ct. 213; Pennsylvania Co. v. Comm., 79 F·. 2d 295;
cert. den., 296 U.S. 651; Whitney vs. State Tnx
Commission, 309 U.S. 530, 84 L. Ed. 909, 60 S.C.
635.
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"For tax purposes a general power of appoint1nent
is equivalent to ownership of the property subject to the
power." (Quoted in ol. 10 A.L.R. Digest, Succession
and Estate Taxes, Sec. 38, P. 683, and cases cited
thereat).

'T

Respondent has presented no reason, and Appellant
submits there is none, why a person holding the absolute
power over chattels, however the absolute power is
-labeled, should not bear his proportionate responsibility
for maintenance of his government by paying his share
of the tax load.
(C) The Case of U. S. vs. Field is not Controlling and is
not Persuasive inasmuch as the Federal Revenue Statute which
was Construed in 1921 Differed Materially from our Present Utah
Estate Tax Statute.

Respondent has cited us the Field case (U. S. v.
Stanley Field, 255 U.S. 257, 65 L. Ed. 617, 41 Sup. Ct.
Rep. 256, 18 A.L.R. 1461) in which the Supreme Court
held that the 1916 Internal Revenue Code provision for
taxation of decedents' estates did not authorize the taxation of powers of appointment. Respondent suggests that
the Field case governs the disposition of the case before
this court.
The statute construed in th·e Field case (U.S.
Statutes at Large, Vol. 39 p. 777-778) taxed:

" * * * all property real or personal, tangible or
intangible * * *."
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Wher(\Jls our Utah statute (Title 59-12-3, U.C.A.
1953) incI udes :

" * * * all property real or personal, * * * and
any interest therein whether tangible or intangible which shall pa.ss to any person in trust or
otherwise * * * ." (Emphasis added)
Appellant submits that the substantial difference in
wording, emphasis, and intended scope of the two
statutes, destroys any compelling, or even persuasive,
weight to he attached to the Field case.
CONCLUSION
Appellant submits that the policies gave Mrs. Fenner absolute title to the proceeds "held on deposit" for
her, and suggests that the p-rovisions for withdrawal did
not in any real way limit her ti tie. Furthermore, should
this court choose to call these withdrawal p-rovisions a
power of appointment, there is no reason in law, and
certainly none in equity, why Respondent should thereby
be allowed to evade payment of her fair share of this
state's tax incidence.
C. PRESTON ALLEN,
ADAM M. DUNCAN,

Attorneys for Appell'a.nt,
Utah State Tax Commission.
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